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DE-REGUIATION OF THE AIR WAVES:
IS ANTITRUST ENOUGH?
EDWARD D. CAVANAGH
There goes the last DJ
Who plays what he wants to play,
Says what he wants to say,
Hey Hey! Hey!
There goes your freedom of choice.
There goes the last human voice.
There goes the last DJ *
By enacting the Telecommunications Act of 19961, Congress
mandated large-scale deregulation of the television, radio,
telecommunications and cable industries. Having successfully
de-regulated the airline, interstate transportation and energy
industries, Congress sought to dismantle the tangled legal,
administrative and regulatory structure that had governed
broadcast media and telecommunications for decades and replace
it with a competitive model. Its goal was to minimize the
inefficiencies inherent in any regulatory scheme and allow
participants to reap the economic benefits of the free market.
Equally important, Congress wanted to be sure that the
emerging cable, satellite and cellular technologies were not
stifled by the incumbent regulatory structure, which many
viewed as outmoded and ill-suited to the marketplace of the 21st
century. To assure that competition would be preserved in the
TOM PETTY, The Last DJ, on THE LAST DJ (Warner Brothers 2002).
1 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (stating
purpose of act is to promote competition and reduce regulation so as to secure lower prices
and higher quality for telecommunications consumers).
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absence of regulation, Congress made clear that antitrust law
principles would govern this newly deregulated market. 2
Nowhere has the impact of the Telecommunications Act been
more dramatic than in the radio field. The Act unleashed a
merger wave which has dramatically altered the competitive
landscape in radio. That merger wave has certainly benefited
many station owners by permitting them to capture economies of
scale that simply could not have been achieved under a
regulatory regime which limited the number of stations any
entity could own.
These greater operational efficiencies, however, have come at a
price. Fewer owners have led to fewer choices for radio listeners
and hence reduced content diversity. The consolidation wave has
also reduced ownership diversity; a smaller percentage of radio
stations are now owned by blacks and Hispanics. Increased
emphasis on the bottom line has led many stations to abandon
local programming in favor of nationally syndicated shows
starring personalities such as Imus or Howard Stern.3  As
Congress, the Federal Communications Commission and the
courts have chiseled away at owner restrictions in broadcasting,
critics have pointed out that it is "important to the health of a
democracy that a few powerful economic interests do not
monopolize information outlets."4 Moreover, especially in the
case of radio, it is not clear that the foregoing risk factors are
counterbalanced by increased benefits to consumers offered by
emerging cable, satellite and cellular technology. The revolution
in communication technology has not led to an increase in
available radio wavelengths, which remain essentially the same
as they were in the 1930's, 5 although newly introduced satellite
radio is intriguing.
This article examines the role of antitrust in preserving
2 See Telecommunications Act §601(b)(1) (noting that nothing in Act shall be
construed to modify, impair or supersede applicability of antitrust laws).
3 See Laura M. Holson, With By-the-Numbers Radio, Requests Are a Dying Breed,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at C1 (arguing that use of national research by major radio
chains has resulted in radio programming sounding similar across nation).
4 ProtectingMedia Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2002, at A14.
5 See Michael Ortner, Current Public Law and Policy Issues: Serving A Different
Master-The Decline of Diversity and the Public Interest in American Radio in the Wake of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 139,147 (2000)
(explaining that unlike television, ceiling on number of options available to radio
consumers has remained relatively unchanged for decades).
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competition among radio broadcasting outlets in an era of
deregulation. It concludes that traditional antitrust analysis has
been narrowly applied in the radio arena. Unless antitrust
enforcers begin to focus on broader public policy goals, which
have historically governed radio, notably consumer choice and
content diversity, antitrust will not be an effective tool in
preventing the monopolization of radio outlets. That would leave
it up to the FCC and Congress to re-regulate radio broadcasting
in a way which would promote consumer choice while minimizing
regulatory inefficiencies.
BACKGROUND: RADIO REGULATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Radio communication began as a novelty: a means of
transmitting wireless signals to and from remote points on the
globe. As the potential of radio as an entertainment medium
became apparent, entrepreneurs rushed in to establish broadcast
outlets. Soon, confusion reigned; the airwaves were cluttered
with static and interference from rival broadcasters. Disputes
arose as to who owned the airwaves and who had the right to
broadcast at a given time.6 Congress addressed this problem by
enacting the Radio Act of 19127 which authorized the Commerce
Department to resolve these disputes. The Act did not, however,
create an administrative board to oversee the process and that
fact, coupled with an inhospitable judiciary, doomed it to failure.8
In 1927, Congress tried again with the Radio Act of 1927.9
That law established the National Radio Commission to provide
comprehensive regulation of the broadcast field.l0 Among other
things, the 1927 Act empowered the Commission to issue
broadcast licenses, establish hours of broadcast, and assign
6 See Ortner, supra note 5, at 141 (explaining that increase in number of radio
stations in 1920s resulted in numerous controversies over which broadcasters had right to
use which wavelengths).
7 Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (1912) (granting Secretary of
Commerce and Labor power to resolve disputes as to who had right to broadcast over
which radio wavelengths and when).
8 See Ortner, supra note 5, at 141 (stating that extensive chaos of early radio
broadcast disputes could not be effectively regulated by Secretary and that court decisions
"removed the teeth" of Radio Act of 1912).
9 Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (establishing Federal
Radio Commission and granting it authority to regulate radio broadcasting).
10 See Ortner, supra note 5, at 142 (stating Congress empowered Commission to
regulate all radio transmissions, both pubic and private, in United States).
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wavelengths. 1 It required the Commission in issuing broadcast
licenses to assure that the licensee served the "public
convenience, interest, or necessity" of the local listening
audience.12  Seven years later, Congress passed the
Communications Act of 1934,13 which created the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC"), an administrative body
charged with implementing and overseeing regulation of
broadcast entities.
The 1934 Act retained the "public interest, convenience or
necessity" language of its predecessor. From the beginning, the
FCC, in enforcing the 1934 Act, sought to meet its mandate by
pursuing the goals of programming diversity and service of the
public interest.14  As originally drafted, the Act had no
limitations on station ownership. Over time, the Act was
amended to provide specific limitations on station ownership.
Thus, immediately before passage of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, an entity could own no more than two AM and two FM
stations in a given market1 5 and no more than 40 nationwide.16
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 significantly loosened these
restrictions. Under the new law, an entity could own as many as
eight stations in a given market; and the restrictions on the
number of radio stations that could be owned nationally were
abrogated. 17
11 See id. (stating Commission had authority to grant licenses, assign wavelengths
and make specifications regarding equipment).
12 See id. (stating that Act mandated that Commission's legal discretion in granting
licenses be aimed at assuring that broadcasters' goals served public interest and
convenience).
13 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (creating Federal Communications Commission to regulate
foreign and national communication commerce in radio).
14 See Great Lakes Broad. Co. v. Fed. Radio Comm'n, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930)
(affirming FCC's denial of full broadcasting time to one radio channel and splitting of
broadcasting times between two different radio channels); see also Ortner, supra note 5,
at 145 (stating that Great Lakes Broad. Co. and its progeny signified FCC's protection of
public interest through commitment to programming diversity).
15 See Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, 59 Fed. Reg. 49006, 49007 (Sept. 15,
1994) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73) (limiting number of radio stations party could
own to three in markets with fourteen or fewer commercial radio stations and limiting
ownership to two AM and two FM stations in markets with fifteen or more commercial
radio stations).
16 See Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, 59 Fed. Reg. at 49,008 (providing that no
entity shall own more than 20 AM or 20 FM stations within two years of effective date of
Rule); see also Ortner, supra note 5, at 145 (noting that amendments to Communications
Act of 1934 specifically limited number of radio stations single entity could own to forty).
17 See Telecommunications Act §§ 202(a)-(b) (eliminating limitation on number of AM
and FM broadcast stations that single entity may own or control and utilizing sliding
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ANTITRUST ANALYSIS IN RADIO MERGERS
Historically, antitrust played almost no role in scrutinizing
radio mergers. That is because FCC restrictions on station
ownership (four in a given market, forty nationwide) were far
more restrictive than what might be allowed under the antitrust
laws.18 Antitrust became a factor in radio mergers only after the
enactment of the Telecommunications Act with its mandate to
loosen regulatory restrictions on station ownership.19 The impact
of the Telecommunications Act on radio ownership was bothimmediate and dramatic. In the year immediately following
passage of the Act, over one thousand radio mergers occurred. 20
In the period 1996-2001, the number of radio station holders
declined by 25%, even though the total number of stations
increased by 7%.21 The largest station owner, Clear Channel,
now owns over 1200 stations.22 By contrast, the largest radio
owner in 1995, Westinghouse and its affiliates, held 85 stations. 23
Notwithstanding the increase in the total number of stations, the
number of owners has declined. From March 1996 to March
2000, the number of radio station owners per market declined by
three.24
scale of commercial radio station ownership based upon number of commercial stations in
given market).
18 See Lawrence Fullerton, Current Issues in Radio Station Merger Analysis, Address
Before the Business Development Associates Antitrust 1997 Conference (Oct. 21, 1996)
(stating merger enforcement is new phenomenon in radio industry because FCC
restrictions on station ownership tended to be more binding than antitrust constraints),
available at http./-/awwv.usdojgov/Atr/public/speeches/speech fullerton.htm (last visited
October 30, 2002).
19 See id. (stating that although Telecommunications Act raised station ownership
limits, Act made clear that antitrust review of radio station mergers was left unaltered).
20 See Joel I. Klein, DOJAnalysis of Radio Mergers (Feb. 19, 1997) (stating there has
been explosion of over 1000 radio mergers since passage of Telecommunications Act of
1996), available at http://qww usdoj.gor'/ati/publicspeechesji.97219.htm. (last visited
October 30, 2002).
21 See Federal Communications Commission, Review of the Radio Industry, 2001
(Sept. 2001) (stating that over five year period between March 1996 and March 2001,
number of commercial radio stations increased 7.1% while number of station owners
decreased by 25%), available at http://wtvw.fcc.gov/mb/policy/radio.htmI (last visited
October 30, 2002).
22 See Media Access Project, Issues: Media Consolidation/Encouraging Diversity of
the Electronic Media (stating Clear Channel Communications owned 1,202 stations in
2001), available at http://wwa:mediaccess.org/programs/diversity/index.html (last visited
October 30, 2002; see also Holson, supra note 3, at C8 (stating that Clear Channel has
doubled its number of stations since 1999).
23 See Media Access Project, supra note 22 (stating Westinghouse owned 85 radio
stations in 1996).
24 See Federal Communications Commission, supra note 21 (stating such decline is
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72 ST JOHNSJOURMAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
In analyzing radio mergers, the Department of Justice
Antitrust Division has focused principally on the questions of
whether the mergers would lead to increased prices for radio
advertising.25 In answering this question, the Justice
Department uses the analytical techniques embodied in the 1992
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.26  The first step under the
Guidelines is to define the relevant product and geographic
markets. Products are considered to be in the same market if
they are substitutes, price, use and quality considered. The
principal focus of the debate on product market is whether radio
is a separate and distinct product or whether it is part of a
broader "media" market that would include radio, television,
cable newspapers and the Internet. The Justice Department has
consistently maintained that radio advertising is unique and not
interchangeable with other forms of media advertising, and
hence a relevant product market. 27
A geographic market is determined by the area of effective
competition. 28 A geographic market may be local, i.e., a city;
regional, i.e., a state or region of the country; national; or
international. Because by its nature, radio advertising is highly
localized, most mergers are analyzed in narrowly defined local
markets. 29 Generally, in radio cases the issue of geographic
market has not been a highly disputed issue. 30
Once a relevant market is defined, the next step is to
determine the likely competitive effect of the proposed merger. 31
Enforcers will challenge only those radio mergers, which are
due primarily to mergers between existing radio station owners).
25 See Fullerton, supra note 18 (stating Department of Justice's review of radio
mergers focuses on risk that mergers will result in increased radio advertising prices).
26 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (Sept. 10, 1992) (outlining
enforcement policy of Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission concerning
horizontal acquisitions and mergers).
27 See Fullerton, supra note 18 (stating Department of Justice has taken position that
radio advertising is relevant product market for antitrust purposes).
28 See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41,552 (stating geographic
markets are determined based upon where firms produce or sell).
29 See Klein, supra note 20 (stating Department of Justice generally utilizes
metropolitan areas as appropriate markets when assessing market power).
30 See id (stating problems only arise when argument is made that because radio
station can be heard in given area station should be included within area's geographic
market).
31 See id (stating that once relevant geographic market is defined, Department of
Justice then considers whether merger will create or enhance market power within
geographic market).
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likely to produce significant, non-transitory increases in
advertising rates.3 2 As a rule of thumb a significant non-
transitory price increase is one that results in rate increases of 5
percent for at least one year.33
Coordinated effects are anticompetitive where the merger
increases the likelihood the competitors in the post-merger
market will cooperate on price rather than compete or where the
merger would facilitate cooperation on price.3 4 For example,
assume that a relevant market has six competitors: A, B, C, D, E
and F. A and B merge. Now there are five competitors. In
analyzing the coordinated effects of the merger, the Justice
Department asks whether the A-B mergers would facilitate
collusion with C, D, E and F.
The theory of unilateral effects, which is the predominant
mode of analysis in radio cases, 35 focuses not on the merger's
impact on rivals, but on whether the merger would enable the
new created entity unilaterally to raise prices for advertising.
For example, X owns two of four rock stations in a given
geographic market and seeks to acquire the other two. There are
a number of other formats in this territory, including country,
easy-listening, all-news and classical. Advertisers on the rock
station are trying to target a certain audience. Prior to any
acquisition of the other two stations by X, advertisers can seek to
bargain with X to get lower rates on its stations by threatening to
take their business to the rock stations X does not own. If X
acquires the other two rock stations, that leverage that existed
for advertisers prior to the merger is gone and rates are likely to
go up.3 6 Accordingly, anticompetitive unilateral effects have been
established.
Given the likelihood of anticompetitive effects, the next
32 See Fullerton, supra note 18 (explaining that focus of Department of Justice review
of radio transactions has been on prospect of increased pricing for radio advertising).
33 See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41, 552 (stating Agency
will use 5% price increase to objectively determine effect of small but significant
nontransitory price increases).
34 See Klein, supra note 20 (stating mergers increase likelihood of coordinated
anticompetitive effects because concentrated markets facilitate anticompetitive
cooperation among competitors).
35 See id. (stating that unilateral effects approach has dominated Department of
Justice's analysis of radio mergers).
36 See id. (explaining that when advertiser's first and second choices in radio stations
merge, advertiser's ability to negotiate advertising prices has been diminished).
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question is whether a price increase by the newly merged entity
could be thwarted by rivals through, for example, entry of a new
station or reformatting of an existing station.37 If the answer is
yes, then the merger will be permitted to go forward. If the
answer is no, then the merger raises anticompetitive concerns.
Addressing these anticompetitive concerns is no easy task.
There are no bright-line rules as to when a radio merger will be
judged lawful or unlawful. Nevertheless, where a newly merged
radio station has at least 35% of the advertising revenues in a
defined market, antitrust enforcers are likely to sit up and take
notice. 38
DOES ANTITRUST WORK?
The vast majority of mergers in radio pass muster under the
foregoing analysis. This fact and the undeniable trend toward
concentration in radio ownership which it has produced, has led
critics to question the reliance of antitrust enforcement to assure
competition and to call for re-regulation of broadcast media.39
Antitrust may not be a reliable vehicle for assuring competition
in radio for several reasons. First, its analytical focus is too
narrow. Justice Department scrutiny of mergers has focused
principally on the likely impact on advertising rates.40 Antitrust
analysis has not encompassed other important goals affecting
consumer choice, including content diversity and the need for
local stations to address local concerns. The concern here is that
if the merger trend were to continue unchecked, the public would
be exposed to content furnished by one or two providers. Choices
would be severely limited.41
This concern is not unfounded. More and more, radio stations
throughout the country are eschewing their own original
37 See id. (explaining that once Department of Justice's merger analysis reveals
anticompetitive effects, Department then determines if changed behavior by current
vendors or possibility of new entrants to market will ameliorate harm).
38 See id. (recommending that firms entering into merger agreements that will result
in 35% market share seek advice of antitrust counsel).
39 See Protecting Media Diversity, supra note 4, at A14 (arguing Congress has key
role to play in restructuring regulatory system so as to make system more equitable).
40 See Fullerton, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
41 See Protecting Media Diversity, supra note 4, at A14 (claiming that diversity in
media programming is essential to health of American democracy).
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programming in favor of syndicated programming. 42 Thus, the
Imus and Howard Stern programs, both of which originate in
New York City weekday mornings may be heard throughout the
country in real time. Other syndicated shows, such as Kasey
Kasem's American Top 40, are prerecorded and may be aired at
various times. This trend is not only to fill down listening time,
e.g., overnight, but also extends to peak-listening drive-time
slots. The result is less choice for the listener and less connection
between the programming and the locality where it is aired.
Consumer choice is being undercut in a second, equally
important, way as the radio industry becomes dominated by
three or four radio conglomerates. 43 Radio programmers, intent
on elevating ratings to shore-up the bottom line, no longer
accommodate requests of individual listeners or play music by
unknown bands. 44 Rather, they play only music that research
polls indicate are favored by listeners. Some stations charge
record companies as much as $20,000 per song to "pretest"
unreleased music on their nationwide networks. 45 All of this,
critics say, has produced homogenized radio music and erected
barriers to entry for new sounds. 46
There are two responses to these concerns. Antitrust
conservatives would not be particularly alarmed about these
developments from an antitrust perspective because the principal
goal of antitrust enforcement is to assure that markets operate
efficiently. 47 Antitrust in their view, should not be used to
dictate programming decisions.
The second response is that consumer choice is an important
aspect of a competitive market.48 Put another way, reduction in
42 See Polly Higgins, Tucson Radio Making Waves: Corporate Radio Moves In,
TUCSON CITIZEN, May 3, 2002, at Al (noting that rapid increase of syndicated
programming and decreased diversification is in sharp contrast with original purpose of
radio to function as local medium).
43 See Holson, supra note 3, at Cl (noting that world of radio is evolving into industry
dominated by three or four major chains).
44 See id. (stating that radio programmers no longer play songs requested by listeners
or risk playing songs by unknown local bands).
45 See id. (noting that radio division of Clear Channel Communications charges record
labels up to $20,000 to test unreleased music on its nationwide network of programmers).
46 See id. (arguing radio programmers' quest for ratings has led to homogenization of
music radio).
47 See e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF;
WITH A NEW INTRODUCTION AND EPILOGUE, 50-90 (The Free Press 1993) (1978) (arguing
that goal of anti-trust law is maximization of consumer welfare).
48 See Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U.
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consumer choice is a reduction in competition. 49 Under this view,
antitrust is an appropriate vehicle to address reduction in
content choice. Indeed, reduction in content choice was a
significant issue in the AOLJTime-Warner merger. 50 The fact is,
the view of the Chicago School notwithstanding, preservation of
consumer choice has always been an important component of
antitrust policy. The Supreme Court in the Northern Paciticfl
case described the Sherman Act as a "comprehensive charter of
economic liberty" which "rests on the premise that unrestrained
interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress.. ."52 Implicit in this declaration is
that misallocation of resources and artificially high prices distort
consumer choice.
Reduction of consumer choice has been explicitly held to be the
basis for finding certain joint conduct illegal. In FTC v. Indiana
Federation of Dentists53 the Supreme Court found that an
agreement among rival dentists to withhold patients' dental
records from insurers was unlawful for "limiting consumer choice
by impeding the 'ordinary give and take of the marketplace"'. 54
Similarly in United States v. Visa Inc.,55 the trial court
condemned exclusionary practices of Visa and Mastercard which
PITT. L. REV. 503, 503 (2001) (stating antitrust laws are designed to ensure competitive
marketplace that produces worthwhile consumer options).
49 See United States of America v. Visa U.S.A., Inc, 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 330-79
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding defendant's exclusionary rules restricted competition by denying
consumers innovative and varied products); see also FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (holding dentists' agreement to withhold particular x-ray services
from patients was anti-competitive in nature and impaired market ability to advance
social welfare).
50 See Protecting Media Diversity, supra note 4 (suggesting media giants like
AOLiTime Warner will benefit from District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision
nullifying F.C.C cross-ownership rule and allowing same company ownership of both
cable and local broadcasting systems).
51 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 2-12 (1958) (finding that Northern
Pacific Railway manipulated economic power gained through its extensive landholdings to
persuade purchasers and lessees to give Northern Pacific preference over competitors in
transporting goods).
52 Id. at 4.
53 476 U.S. at 459 (holding dentists' agreement to withhold particular x-ray services
from patients was anti-competitive in nature and impaired market ability to advance
social welfare).
54 Id. at 459.
55 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (repealing defendant's exclusionary rules
because they served to restrict competition among card companies and harmed consumer
choice).
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it found had stifled innovation and had ultimately denied
consumers choice in selecting payment instruments, including
"smart cards". 56
Finally, in United States v. Microsoft Corp.,57 perhaps the most
significant antitrust case of this generation, the central
competitive concern has not been the monopolistic prices charged
by Microsoft but rather the diminution in consumer choice
caused by Microsoft's stifling of innovation and delayed
introduction of new products.5 8
Professor Robert Lande, in his thoughtful article entitled
Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal ofAntitrust 59 has argued
persuasively that consumer choice should be given a more
prominent role in antitrust analysis. He correctly notes that a
consumer choice orientation in antitrust cases will normally
result in a continuation of current enforcement policies.60 More
important is Lande's observation that the effect on consumer
choice is a significant factor to consider in passing on media
mergers. 61 The acquisition of one radio station by another may
not lead to any significant, permanent increase in advertising
rates; but it may lead to loss of editorial diversity, a loss that
cannot be regained through non-price competition among
surviving firms, since any new product would bear the approval
stamp of the merged company.62
One example of how lack of editorial diversity can harm
consumer interests is the fiasco that resulted from the media
56 Id. at 347-353 (describing how smart cards function and how defendants impeded
development of smart card technology and promoted anti-competitive practices).
57 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding that defendant violated Sherman
Antitrust Act by maintaining monopoly power and by attempting to monopolize Web
browser market by illegally tying its Web browser to its operating system) modifying 253
F. 3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) cert. denied 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).
58 See id. at 40 (stating Microsoft's anticompetitive actions destroyed competitive
process which stimulates innovation and conduces to benefit of consumers).
59 See Lande, supra note 48, at 504-05 (arguing consumer choice centered antitrust
policy will lead to more efficient market, lower prices, better quality, higher consumer
surplus and will protect important elements such as innovation, variety, quality and
safety).
60 See id. at 514-15 (stating choice orientation to antitrust will result in continuation
of current enforcement policies and will, in few situations, extend protections into new
areas).
61 See id. at 517-18 (arguing media mergers should be scrutinized for loss of non-price
competition along dimension of programming diversity).
62 See id. at 517 (stating that if one communications medium were to buy another of
same kind, market would suffer loss of editorial diversity that could not be recreated
through non-price competition mechanism).
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attempts to project the results from Florida in the 2000
presidential election. 63 All six media outlets64 involved called the
election wrong twice because they all relied on the same polling
data. Initially, each entity relied on its own data, but by the
early 1990's the six outlets decided to merge their exit polling
operations. This may have been good from a business
perspective, but it was clearly bad for consumers.
Accordingly, the problem is not with antitrust itself but how it
is implemented by enforcement agencies. The fact that antitrust
enforcement is largely left to the discretion of agency heads,
however, is a second reason that critics of the status quo lack
confidence in antitrust as the guarantor of competition in radio
broadcasting. The intensity of antitrust enforcement has
historically been cyclical, as events in recent decades
demonstrate. Antitrust enforcement in the Carter
Administration was vigorous. In the Reagan Administration,
federal civil antitrust enforcement virtually disappeared. Agency
activity picked up moderately during the first Bush
Administration and came into full flower during the Clinton
years.
While it is still much too early to make any definitive
judgments about the antitrust enforcement record of the second
Bush White House, critics have voiced doubt about the
Administration's commitment to antitrust. The focal point of this
criticism has been a proposed pact,65 since disbanded, between
the Antitrust Division and the FTC, dividing responsibilities for
the pre-merger review process under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.66 Under that Act, the
Antitrust Division and the FTC share concurrent jurisdiction
over pre-merger review.67 In some cases, both agencies express
63 See id. at 519-22 (discussing 2000 Presidential election as example of what can
happen when inadequate competition in media sector leads to inadequate consumer
choice).
64 See id. at 519 (describing how every major network prematurely and incorrectly
declared that Vice President Gore had won Florida primary).
65 See Cheryl Leanza and Harold J. Feld, Choice for Consumers, LEGAL TIMES, May
27, 2002 at 54 (stating FTC and Department of Justice's rescission of agreement to assign
antitrust review for each commercial sector to one agency bodes well for American
consumers who benefit from overlapping jurisdiction).
66 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2002).
67 See id. (stating FTC and Antitrust Division of Department of Justice must each
receive notification).
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interest in scrutinizing a proposed merger. When that happens,
representatives of each agency meet to "clear" pre-merger review
to one agency or the other to avoid duplication of effort and to
assure consistency in decision - making. In 2001, to make the
pre-merger process even more transparent and efficient, Charles
James of the Antitrust Division and Tim Muris of FTC, proposed
a pact that would determine in advance which agency would be
responsible. 68 Under that plan, most media and communications
mergers would fall into the bailiwick of the Antitrust Division.69
Critics of the proposed division of labor expressed fear that if
this plan were implemented, media mergers would be simply
rubber-stamped by the Justice Department and escape any
serious antitrust review.70  They urged that the FTC, an
independent agency of government, not be forced to cede
jurisdiction of merger review in specified fields because having
two rather than one watchdog was more likely to assure
appropriate antitrust review of mergers in the broadcast
industry.71
The firestorm surrounding this proposed plan has subsided
because the agencies, under pressure from some in Congress,72
have decided to abandon it. Nevertheless, this tactical retreat by
the agencies has done little to restore the confidence of critics
that antitrust alone can effectively preserve competition in
broadcast media. Indeed, recent court decisions 73 and the FCC's
own moderation of restrictions on broadcast station ownership
are likely to accelerate the trend in media mergers.
The question is how to preserve the free market and at the
same time preserve diversity of news, entertainment and
68 See Leanza, supra note 61, at 54 (stating assistance attorney general for antitrust,
Charles James, secretly negotiated with FTC Chairman Timothy Muris).
69 See id. at 54 (stating FTC would have been precluded from acting in
telecommunications and media merger cases).
70 See id. (stating most controversial aspect of joint memorandum was assignment of
telecommunications and media mergers to Department of Justice).
71 See id. (arguing that dual-agency review ensures that both agencies will develop
comprehensive approach to examining difficult mergers).
72 See Caroline E. Myers, Merger Review Plan Scuttled; Hollings' Threats Kill
Proposal, THE WASHINGTON POST, May 21, 2002 at E-1 (stating Justice Department and
FTC, in face of strong opposition from Senator Ernest F. Hollings, indicated to Senate
that they would abandon agreement).
73 See e.g., Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding
FCC's decision not to repeal or modify national television ownership rule and
cable/broadcast cross-ownership rule was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law).
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opinion, as well as localism. This is no easy task. Redirected
antitrust enforcement is one potential avenue for preserving the
balance between efficiency and diversity. But, any antitrust
solution is necessarily short term and ad hoc.
Congress, the FCC and courts, by chiseling away at ownership
restrictions piecemeal, have produced a patchwork quilt of
uneven and perhaps inequitable regulation.74  The current
system is in obvious need of restructuring, and Congress is in the
best position to revisit all issues affecting broadcast ownership
and mergers. Deregulation, while a step in the right direction, is
not the answer. Some modest regulation by Congress, which
assures that the channels of mass communications, so vital to
our democracy, are not merged into the hands of two or three
media conglomerates, thereby preserving diversity of content and
localism in broadcast media, is essential. Congress now has a
window of opportunity in which to act; its failure to do so may
have a devastating impact on the market for free ideas. In the
meantime, it is both unfair and unwise to expect that antitrust
can provide all the answers.
74 See Protecting Media Diversity, supra note 4 (stating Congress, FCC and courts
have chiseled away intricate web of media ownership rules designed to preserve
competition and diversity in information marketplace and replaced it with process that
has resulted in inequitable regulation).
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